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COMMENT
BANK BRANCHING IN WASHINGTON:
A NEED FOR REAPPRAISAL
A potentially stagnant and unresponsive commercial banking in-
dustry subsists in many areas of Washington State1 as a result of the
combined effects of state statutory restrictions on bank branching2
and the enforcement of federal antitrust statutes.3 State law precludes
a commercial bank from establishing a branch in a new geographic
market outside of the city in which the bank is headquartered; 4 the
same bank alternatively seeking to expand into the new geographic
market by merger with an already existing bank probably will be en-
joined by federal action under section 7 of the Clayton Act.5 Hence, a
/
1. The importance of banks in economic development was noted in COMPTROLLER
OF CURRENCY, BANKS AND COMMUNITY PROGRESS 2-3 (1963):
[T] here should also be an awareness of the important role which banks have to
play in that future.... We have all heard the argument that the forces which lead to
economic growth are certain to have their effects-and that banks will correspond
to the needs as they appear, without any special public concern for the manner in
which banks perform. This, we believe, is a mistaken view. Where banking facilities
are inadequate, the forces of economic growth will not be fully realized. But more
important, banks can assert a positive influence in exploring, fostering, supporting,
and directing the economic development of a community or a nation. Where there
is a failure to assert this positive influence, opportunities for economic develop-
ment may long remain quiescent .... Unless adequate banking facilities are avail-
able at all points at which resources are needed to finance enterprise, economic
development will be hampered or distorted. The greatest needs for banking facili-
ties are precisely at the points at which prospective future growth is most prom-
ising.
Although the State of Washington has recently undergone some economic reversals,
most indications are for statewide economic development in the near future. See gener-
ally STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
STATE OF WASHINGTON ECONoMic REVIEW 1971 AND OUTLOOK FOR 1972 (1972). This
predicted economic development further accentuates the need for a responsive commer-
cial banking industry.
2. WASH. REV. CODE § 30.40.020 (Supp. 1972). See note 19 infra.
3. Most bank mergers are challenged under section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.§ 18 (1970); occasionally a bank merger will be challenged under sections 1 and/or 2 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2 (1970).
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 30.40.020 (Supp. 1972). See note 19 infra.
5. In 1971, complaints were filed by the Department of Justice under section 7 of
the Clayton Act against three Washington banks seeking to expand geographically by
merger. See note 55 and accompanying text infra.
The term "merger" as used in this Comment includes all transactions which bring
enterprises that were previously independent under single control, whether the transac-
tion takes the form of a statutory merger of one corporate entity into another, a consoli-
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bank effectively is precluded from expanding geographically to meet
the needs and demands of growing communities outside the city in
which the bank has its principal place of business.6 Many communi-
ties, especially those distant from major metropolitan centers, conse-
quently are left with one small bank in an essentially monopolistic
position. 7 Other communities may have more than one bank, but
competition and available banking alternatives may be minimal. 8
Thus, Washington is left in the anomalous position of having a de-
mand for geographic expansion by commercial banks which cannot
be met because of state and federal statutory constraints. This
problem is different than the typical free branching/unit bank contro-
versy9 because the underlying policy of the present statute to allow
branching by merger is being frustrated by Justice Department antitrust
enforcement. As a result, a reappraisal of Washington's bank branch-
ing policy is in order.
dation through which a new corporation supplants two or more predecessors, an acquisi-
tion of control over previously independent businesses, or a simple purchase of physical
assets of a competitor.
6. This has not been the case in the past. Several of the state's major banks have es-
tablished branches in areas outside their headquarter county. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT IN-
SURANCE CORP., OPERATING BANKING OFFICES 571-82 (1972) for a listing of cities and
banking offices within those cities. This geographic expansion, however, was accom-
plished prior to active Justice Department intervention in the banking industry which
began with United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 347 U.S. 321 (1963). See note 39
and accompanying text infra.
7. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP., OPERATING BANKING OFFICES 571-82
(1972).
8. See text accompanying note 80 infra.
9. See generally Edwards, The Banking Competition Controversy, reprinted in AD-
MINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS, STUDIES IN BANKING COMPETITION AND THE BANKING
STRUCTURE 303 (1966); Note, Present Banking Structure in Florida and Branch Bank-
ing, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 84 (1967); Comment, Branch Banking in Colorado--A Pro-
posalfor Reform, 48 DENVER L.J. 575 (1972).
The unit/branch banking controversy centers on the efficacy of each system. Unit
banking states limit banks to one site; each bank is completely autonomous, possesses
its own capital, and has its own board of directors. Bank branching allows multiple of-
fices of the same bank. It should be pointed out that while Washington's laws are restric-
tive, they are far from the most restrictive in the United States. There are 15 states which
allow unit banking only, although 10 of the. 15 allow tellers' windows separate from the
unit bank itself. These tellers' windows can accept deposits and exchange currency, but
cannot make loans. The 10 are Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota and Oklahoma. The five with the most restrictive
bank branching laws, those which allow only unit banks with no auxiliary offices, are
Colorado, Minnesota, Texas, West Virginia and Wyoming.
Sixteen states have limited bank branching laws which restrict branch banking either
on a county-wide, region-wide, or mileage basis. These states include Alabama, Georgia,
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.
Nineteen states allow state-wide branching either de novo or by merger. These include
612
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Analyzing present bank branching policy and formulating a new
policy are difficult because of the complex nature of the commercial
banking industry. Obviously the state should work toward a banking
structure which will maximize benefits for its citizens. In pursuing this
goal, the state must work within a complex framework including ex-
isting state and federal regulation of commercial banking and current
federal antitrust policies. In addition, the state must consider the im-
pact of concentration in its commercial banking industry. Only after
all these facets of commercial banking are considered can an effective
branch banking policy be formulated.
I. THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF COMMERCIAL
BANKING
It is practical to limit discussion of bank branching to commercial
banks. These banks include a wide variety of institutions which are
chartered under either state or federal law, best identified as those
banks which accept demand and time deposits from the public while
providing numerous collateral services. 10 'Mutual savings banks, sav-
ings and loan associations, and many other institutions whose activites
overlap some facets of commercial banking are not included in the
classification.
Commercial banks play a dual role in the economy: they serve the
financial and credit needs of individuals and business and they provide
a circulating medium in the form of deposits." Combining these two
Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Maryland,
Nevada, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia and Washington. See Gup, A Review of State Laws on Branch
Banking, 88 BANKING LJ. 675 (1971).
While it appears that Washington and Oregon have more liberal laws than 60 percent
of the other states, this statistic is deceptive. While branching is allowed by merger on a
state-wide basis in these two states, branching in fact is restricted to a bank's home
county. The result is the creation of two state banking systems which are among the
most highly concentrated systems in the United States, with Oregon's banking controlled
by just two banks and Washington's banking concentrated primarily among the top five
banks.
10. Commercial banking was established as the relevant line of commerce in
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'I Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). These banks provide "a
cluster of products (various kinds of credit) and services (such as checking accounts and
trust administration) denoted by the term 'commercial banking."' Id. at 356.
11. THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, THE COMMERCIAL BANKING INDUSTRY 40
(1962). Jacobs, The Framework of Commercial Bank Regulation: An Appraisal, re-
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functions in one institution has brought two basic philosophies into
conflict. One concept, urging that financial and credit services should
compete freely, logically implies that unsuccessful banks will fail in
the market place. 12 Countering this philosophy is concern that the cir-
culating medium remain secure and viable, suggesting that those as-
pects of competition which might contribute to bank failure must be
regulated. 13 Throughout the history of commercial banking, this bi-
furcation in public policy has been reflected in extensive regulation of
commercial banking coupled with demands for competition similar to
those imposed on unregulated industries.' 4
Regulation of commercial banking is complex and pervasive. Those
national banks which are chartered by the federal government are
supervised by the Comptroller of Currency; state chartered banks are
supervised by state authorities. In addition, state banks which are
members of the Federal Reserve System are supervised by the Federal
Reserve Bank of their district, and insured state banks not members of
the Federal Reserve System are supervised by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation. Banking regulation largely is geared to pre-
vent destructive competition between banks and hence to preserve
public confidence in a stable and viable banking system.' 5 All banks
are prohibited from paying interest on demand deposits, and interest
rates on time deposits are limited to a specified maximum.' 6 Price
printed in ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS, STUDIES IN BANKING COMPETITION AND
THE BANKING STRUCTURE 337, 340 (1966) summarizes the "circulating medium" func-
tion as follows:
A healthy commercial banking system is necessary for a well functioning economy.
Commercial banks are the major medium through which money transfers are made.
Such an agency is needed to facilitate the rapid, low cost transfer of money. Com-
mercial banks hold a large part of the liquidity of the nation. Should the banking
system fail or falter, these liquid assets would be wiped out or impaired.
12. THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, THE COMMERCIAL BANKING INDUSTRY
52(1962).
13. Id. See also Comptroller of Currency, A Statement of Policy, 102nd Annual
Report, reprinted in ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS, STUDIES IN BANKING COMPETI-
TION AND THE BANKING STRUCTURE 401, 402 (1966), which summarizes reasons for regula-
tory intercession in banking.
14. Virtually every function of commercial banking is regulated by state and fed-
eral agencies. See generally WASH. REV. CODE tit. 30 (1961); U.S.C. tit. 12 (1945).
In contrast, see United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), and
United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970), which
impose on commercial banking basically the same standard of competition that is im-
posed on unregulated industries.
15. Note, Federal Regulation of Bank Mergers: The Opposing Views of the Federal
Banking Agencies and the Department of Justice, 75 HARV. L. REV. 756, 764 (1962).
16. Id.
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competition in the consumer and business loan market is limited by
state usury laws which set the maximum interest rates and by the
prime interest rate which usually represents the minimum rate avail-
able. The effect of these and other regulations is to limit the scope of
price competition among commercial banks. Most competition is lim-
ited to interest rates for consumer and commercial loans17 and in the
quality of the bank's products and services.' 8
Banking stability and viability also is maintained by strict regula-
tion of the number and distribution of commercial bank facilities.
New banks cannot be established without a charter from the state or
the federal government. Expansion of existing banking facilities by
branching or merger also is closely controlled.
H. STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON BANK BRANCHING
Washington's bank branching policy is found in R.C.W. §
30.40.020 which prohibits de novo branching into any city or town,
not the site of the branching bank's headquarters, which already has a
banking facility.19 However, the statute does permit banks to expand
into such cities and towns "by taking over or acquiring an existing
17. THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, THE COMMERCIAL BANKING INDUSTRY 54
(1962). On competition for loans, the author notes:
The very character of bank lending explains why so much emphasis is placed on
quality competition in bank lending.. At first glance, bank credit may seem to be
the most homogenous of commodities. Actually, though, no two prospective bor-
rowers offer the bank quite the same package of credit quality and other assurances
of repayment, and of compensating balances and other commensurate advantages
of making the loan. Thus each customer loan, and especially each business loan, a
separately negotiated transaction, is a custom made product with its own special
costs and must be separately priced.
Id.
18. Id. at 53.
19. WASH. REv. CODE § 30.40.020 (Supp. 1972) provides:
A bank or trust company having a paid-in capital of not less than $500,000 may,
with the approval of the supervisor, establish and operate branches in any city or
town within the state. A bank or trust company having a paid-in capital of not less
than $200,000 may, with the approval of the supervisor, establish and operate
branches within the limits of the county in which its principal place of business is
located. The supervisor's approval shall be conditioned on a finding that the re-
sources in the neighborhood of the proposed location and in the surrounding
county offer a reasonable promise of adequate support for the proposed branch and
that the proposed branch is not being formed for other than the legitimate objects
covered by this title.
The aggregate paid-in capital stock of every bank or trust company operating
branches shall at no time be less than the aggregate of the minimum capital re-
quired by law for the establishment of any number of banks or trust companies in
615
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bank, trust company or national banking association operating in
such a city or town."' 20 Thus, while a bank cannot expand by
branching into another city which has an existing bank,21 it can merge
with the existing bank and thereby acquire the monopolistic position
of its predecessor. This ability to expand by merger, however, may be
precluded by application of either federal bank merger statutes or an-
titrust laws. 22
There are several theories which explain the policy underlying
Washington's restrictions on bank branching. The major historical
justification was to prevent another rash of bank failures similar to
those subsequent to the crash of 1929,23 on the assumption that "over-
banking" and excessive competition caused the failure of many banks
after the crash. Restrictive bank branching laws placed limitations on
larger banks and prevented them from overexpansion.24 A second
reason for the restrictions, and perhaps the major current impetus
against liberalization of bank branching laws, is the fear that small,
local banks cannot withstand increased competition from larger insti-
tutions. Advocates of this position believe small banks should continue
cities or towns wherein the principal office or place of business of such bank or
trust company and its branches are located.
No bank or trust company shall establish or operate any branch in any city or
town outside the city or town in which its principal place of business is located in
which any bank, trust company or national banking association regularly transacts
a banking or trust business, except by taking over or acquiring an existing bank,
trust company or national banking association or the branch of any bank, trust
company or national banking association operating in such city or town.
20. Id.
21. This would have been the situation in the attempted merger of Old National
Bank and the Bank of Oroville, which was the only bank in Oroville. The closest com-
petitor, Old National Bank itself, was in Tonasket, 17 miles away. See Complaint,
United States v. Washington Bancshares, Inc., Old Nat'l Bank of Washington and
Oroville State Bank, Civil No. 3505 (E.D. Wash. filed May 25, 1971) at 5.
22. See notes 34-66 and accompanying text infra.
23. The fall of the stock market in October of 1929 set off a chain reaction of bank
failures throughout the United States. The result of this chain reaction was the failure of
some 5000 banks with an additional 1200 being absorbed by stronger banks. Due to
these numerous bank failures, many governors declared bank holidays in their respec-
tive states. When Roosevelt took office in 1933, one of his first acts was to declare a Na-
tional Banking Holiday. After the holiday only the stronger banks were allowed to open
their doors for business. See J. COCHRAN, MONEY, BANKING, AND THE ECONOMY, 67
(1967).
24. 135 AMERICAN BANKER 4 (June 4, 1970). This justification no longer seems so
cogent in view of the controls placed on banking operations by appropriate state and
federal agencies. See notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra.
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to have an important place in the nation's financial structure, 25
arguing that the collapse of small banks increases concentration in
state banking which, in turn, precipitates additional adverse conse-
quences.2 6
There are two additional theories justifying limitations on bank
branching. First, de novo branching probably would significantly reduce
the value of local banks, whose value is preserved and probably en-
hanced by the restriction of bank expansion. Because the local bank is
often in the enviable position of having little or no competition, re-
strictive statutes guarantee the option to sell out to another bank at a
substantial premium. Second, the restrictive branching laws benefit
acquiring banks seeking to enter local markets. Being legally required
to expand by merger allows the expanding bank to avoid the initial
entry costs of establishing a branch; the expanding bank also reaps the
benefits of established customers and good will: Further, expansion by
merger is less likely to cut into profit margins than is expansion by
branching, as the merging bank does not have to compete with an al-
ready established local bank.27
25. E. KOHN, THE FUTURE OF SMALL BANKS 3 (1966). This was especially appro-
priate in the state of Washington in the late thirties and forties when the legislature was
controlled by the rural areas of the state. One can imagine how an eastern Washington
legislator felt about having the banking activities in his district controlled by a bank
based in Seattle, whose directors knew little about such rural communities. Such under-
standably adverse feelings probably cohstituted one of the reasons for WASH. REV. CODE
§ 30.40.020 (Supp. 1972).
The countervailing argument is highlighted by E. Kom, THE FUTURE OF SMALL
BANKS 3 (1966):
On the other hand, those favoring some liberalization of branching laws have raised
the question as to whether it is in the public's interest to provide small banks spe-
cial protection if they cannot provide the kinds of banking services the public needs
and wants, at competitive prices.
26. Horvitz & Shull, Branch Banking, Independent Banks and Geographic Price
Discrimination, 14 ANTITRUST BULL: 827, 838 (1970).
27. Some have argued that in a town where there are very few banks, the addition of
one more bank does not significantly affect the price of money or the services offered,
because in such a community interdependence among the banks is great. Thus, in a
two-or-three-bank town "it seems reasonable to believe that mutually advantageous
agreements, implicit or explicit are prevalent," especially where price is concerned. Id.
at 833.
However, there are current indications that when larger banks have branched into
new suburban areas where relatively small or consumer-oriented banks are already es-
tablished, these larger banks have reduced their prices on consumer installment credit in
order to compete. Such a reduction in price probably is reflected in the profit margin. E.
KOHN, BRANCH BANKING, BANK MERGERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1964).
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The importance of rigid state restrictions on bank branching is
magnified by the fact that the limitations are binding on both
state-chartered commercial banks28 and national banks. 29 Although
the Comptroller of Currency once contended that state law only ap-
plies to national banks in matters of capitalization and bank location
requirements, 30 the Supreme Court recently concluded,31 after re-
viewing the legislative history of the National Banking Act, that Con-
gress intended "to place national and state banks on a basis of com-
petitive equality insofar as branch banking was concerned. '32 In order
to deprive national banks of an unfair competitive advantage over
state banks, national banks must be subject to all the rights and limi-
tations which state laws place on branching by state banks. This view
has been applied subsequently by several lower courts. 33
III. FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANK MERGERS
Washington's restrictions on bank branching invite commercial
banks to expand geographically by merger. This, in turn, subjects the
mergers to regulation under the provisions of the Bank Merger Acts of
1960 and 1966, 34 and ultimately invites violation of section 7 of the
Clayton Act.3 5
28. WASH. REV. CODE § 30.40.020 (Supp. 1972).
29. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
30. First-Citizens Bank and Trust Co. v. Camp, 409 F.2d 1086, 1091 (4th Cir.
1969).
31. First Nat'l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966).
32. Id. at261.
33. Citing Walker as controlling, the court in First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v.
Camp, 409 F.2d 1086 (4th Cir. 1969), found that the comptroller not only must consider
the capitalization and state location requirements (which the comptroller contended
were the only requirements that he was bound to follow), but he also must consider the
needs and convenience criteria which state law imposes on the branch approving author-
ities. The court, however, implied that if these criteria are not specifically defined, then
the comptroller may interpret these standards in the way he sees fit. Id. at 1091. The
court in Clermont Nat'l Bank v. Citizensbank Nat'l Ass'n, 329 F. Supp. 1331 (S.D. Ohio
197 1) agreed with the Fourth Circuit's conclusion in First-Citizens when it stated that
"all of the tests and standards provided by state law must be regarded by and are applic-
able to the comptroller in any decision of his on whether or not to authorize a branch to
a national bank." Id. at 1335. By expressing its conclusion in such language, the Ohio
court seems to have inferred that if state law provides standards or requirements that
must be applied before a branch for a state bank can be approved, national banks also
are subject to such standards or requirements.
34. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1970).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). Section 7 of the Bank Merger Act of 1966 requires the
courts to apply the standards of section 5 of the Act in all judicial proceedings chal-
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The foundation of federal policy toward banking competition is
found in the Bank Merger Acts. The. 1960 Act signaled a congres-
sional reaction to the large number of bank mergers which had caused
increased concentration in the banking industry during the late
1950's.36 Congress also wanted to dispel the notion that bank mergers
were exempt from the antitrust laws.37 Under the 1960 Act, the ap-
propriate bank supervisory agency must consider the following factors
in deciding whether to approve a proposed merger: (1) the financial
history and conditions of each of the banks involved; (2) the adequacy
of their capital structures and their prospects of future earnings; (3)
the general character of their management; (4) the convenience and
needs of the community to be served; and (5) the effect of the merger
on competition. The effect on competition was only one of several rel-
evant factors considered and was determined largely through the non-
controlling, advisory opinion of the Attorney General.38
The 1960 Act did not settle the dispute between the Justice Depart-
ment and the banking regulatory bodies over who should control the
approval of bank mergers. In its 1963 decision, United States v. Phila-
delphia National Bank,3 9 the Supreme Court held that a bank merger
between two metropolitan banks violated section 7 of the Clayton
Act, even though the merger was consummated pursuant to the
Comptroller's approval under the Bank Merger Act of 1960. This
decision, plus greater concentration in the banking industry resulting
lenging bank mergers. Section 5 of the Act incorporates section 7 of the Clayton Act,
modified by a "public interest" exception. Challenges to bank mergers, however, have
continued to be framed in terms of section 7 of the Clayton Act; the relevant tests and
standards used under section 5 of the Bank Merger Act have been identical to tradi-
tional section 7 actions differing only in the treatment of the Bank Merger Act's "public
interest" exception. See United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968).
36. Edwards, Bank Mergers and the Public Interest: A Legal and Economic Anal-
ysis of the 1966 Bank Merger Act, 85 BANKING LJ. 753 (1968).
37. Id.
38. Note, A Legislative History of the 1960 Bank Merger Act and its 1966 Amend-
ment: Judicial Misuse and a Suggested Approach, 44 IND. LJ. 596, 608 (1969).
39. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). Prior to Philadelphia National Bank the fact that banks
were subject to section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), was not clear from
the language of section 7. Section 7 of the Clayton Act as amended in 1950 provides in
pertinent part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
619
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from the approval of nearly 800 mergers between 1960 and 1965,
prompted enactment of the Bank Merger Act of 1966.40 Focusing on
the effects of a merger on competition, the 1966 Act essentially com-
bined the 1960 Act and the antitrust laws. 41 A merger having "sub-
stantial" anticompetitive effects cannot be approved unless "public
interest" benefits "clearly outweigh" the anticompetitive effects. 42 The
1966 Act placed bank mergers under intense scrutiny by requiring the
responsible agency to obtain opinions on the efficacy of the proposed
merger from the other banking agencies and from the Department of
Justice before making any decision.43 It also gave the Department of
Justice the prerogative of enjoining consummation of such mergers if
the Attorney General felt the anticompetitive effects of the merger
outweighed the 1966 Act's public interest, convenience, and needs
exception to section 7 of the Clayton Act.44
Despite efforts of Congress through the Bank Merger Acts to settle
the power struggle between the Comptroller of Currency, other bank
regulatory agencies and the Department of Justice, the Justice Depart-
ment continues to expand the trend set in Philadelphia National Bank,
actively opposing many bank mergers. Between the enactment of the
Bank Merger Act of 1966 and July, 1972, over 45 bank merger com-
plaints were filed by the Justice Department. Possessing the power to
stay bank mergers by filing a complaint within thirty days after the
Comptroller's approval, the Justice Department has the final say on
mergers even marginally anticompetitive. In most cases where merger
has been stayed as the result of Justice Department intervention, the
merging banks have elected to terminate merger plans rather than liti-
gate.45
Justice Department opposition to many bank mergers is designed to
counter trends toward increased concentration of the banking industry
40. Edwards, Bank Mergers and the Public Interest: A Legal and Economic Anal-
ysis of the 1966 Bank Merger Act, 85 BANKING L.J. 753, 754 (1968).
41. See Bank MergerAct of 1966 § 5, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (1970).
42. Id. § 1828(c)(5)(B).
43. Id. § 1828(c)(4).
44. Id. § 1828(c)(7)(A).
45. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST CASES INSTITUTED AND TERMINATED,
JANUARY 1, 1966-JUNE 30, 1972 (1972). Of the three cases instituted in the state of
Washington in 1971, two were terminated because plans for merger were abandoned.
Order of Dismissal, United States v. Bancshares, Inc., Civ. No. 3505 (E.D. Wash. July 2,
1972); Order of Dismissal, United States v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, Civ. No. 313-71C2
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 1972).
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in both local and statewide markets.46 The Court in the 1963 Phila-
delphia National Bank case adopted similar reasoning, holding that
any bank merger which caused increased concentration in the relevant
market was likely to lessen competition and thus should be enjoined
unless it could be shown that the merger would have no anticompeti-
tive effects. 47
The first Supreme Court decision under the Bank Merger Act of
1966 was United States v. Third National Bank. The Court indicated
that a merger resulting in a bank with 38.4 percent of the total assets
within the relevant market was unlawful because it resulted in a bank
which controlled an "undue percentage share of the relevant market,"
causing a "significant increase" in concentration in the relevant
market.48 The Court construed the "convenience and needs" excep-
tion of the 1966 Act as follows:49
If a merger posed a choice between preserving competition and satis-
fying the requirements of convenience and need, the injury and benefit
were to be weighed and the decision was to rest on which alternative
better served the public interest.
The Court went on to hold that in order for the "convenience and
needs" exception to apply, the defendants must have received sub-
46. Donald I. Baker, Director of Policy and Planning for the Antitrust Division,
United States Department of Justice, expressed the Justice Department's position when
he stated:
Bank mergers have been subject to active antitrust enforcement. The Department
of Justice has brought about forty bank cases since the Philadelphia decision in
1963, and over half of these have been within the last three years. The great ma-
jority of these cases involve so called "horizontal" mergers between direct competi-
tors in the same community or market area. Antitrust enforcement against such
local bank mergers has rested on two economic goals: to prevent elimination of
significant and viable competitive alternatives, and to preserve the opportunities
for new entry ....
In addition, the Department has a more general goal in our merger program--to
prevent the largest banks in a state from attaining a position of overwhelming
statewide dominance by systematic acquisition of the leading banks in the local
markets.
Baker, Competition's Role in the Regulation of Banking, THE BANKER'S MAGAZINE
78-79 (Summer, 1971).
47. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). This is the leading case on bank mergers. The Court held
that bank mergers are subject to section 7 of the Clayton Act and established standards
for judging legality of bank mergers under section 7. See note 39 and accompanying
text supra.
48. 390 U.S. 171 (1968).
49. Id. at 185 (emphasis added).
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stantial benefits which could not be obtained under an alternative
method. 50
United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank and Trust Co. 51 is the
latest case decided by the Supreme Court under the Bank Merger Act
of 1966. Phillipsburg extended the Philadelphia National Bank doc-
trine to small banks by subjecting the merger of two small banks in a
small community to the stringent antitrust standards of section 7 of
the Clayton Act, as modified by the public interest exception of the
1966 Bank Merger Act.52
These cases demonstrate that bank mergers will continue to be sub-
ject to stringent enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act and that
the "public interest" exception of the 1966 Bank Merger Act has not
changed matters significantly. 53 In addition, these cases have encour-
aged greater Justice Department scrutiny of bank mergers-a devel-
opment which has a direct effect on Washington's bank branching
policy of encouraging geographic expansion by merger.
During 1971 the United States Department of Justice through its
Antitrust Division filed three complaints against Washington State
50. See Alcorn, Phillipsburg and Beyond-Developing Trends in Substantive Stan-
dards for Bank Mergers, 9 HOUSTON L. REv. 417, 438 (1972).
51. 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
52. Phillipsburg involved the proposed merger of two Phillipsburg banks. The
merger was approved pursuant to the Bank Merger Act by the Comptroller over the
adverse advisory opinions of the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC, and the Attorney
General. The Court found the relevant geographic market to be Phillipsburg-Eaton, with
a population of 88,500 in 1967. The market was served by seven banks with 16 loca-
tions. These banks were relatively small banks with 1967 assets ranging from $13,-
200,000 to $75,600,000. The banks involved were the third and fifth largest in the mar-
ket, and the resulting bank would have been second in size among the six remaining
commercial banks. The Court found the merger violated section 7 of the Clayton Act,
remanding for further findings under the "public interest" exception of the Bank Merger
Act. For comment on the standards utilized in Phillipsburg, see Note, United States v.
Phillipsburg National Bank: A Consideration of Commercial Banking as the Relevant
Line of Commerce in Small Bank Situations, 46 INDIANA L.J. 348 (197 1).
53. Edwards, Bank Merger and the Public Interest: A Legal and Economic Analysis
of the 1966 Bank Merger Act, 85 BANKINa L.J. 753, 795-96 (968), summarizes the
effect of the public interest exception as follows:
The Supreme Court's recent interpretation of the 1966 Bank Merger Act... leads
to the conclusion that the Act has made no practical substantive changes in the law
applicable to bank mergers. The legal standard is still that of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, just as it was prior to the 1966 Act. Upon close analysis neither the
convenience and needs defenses nor the floundering bank defense prove to be sup-
portable in cases where the merger violates the standards of Section 7 .... It may
not be an exaggeration, therefore, to say that all the 1966 Act accomplished was to
end the controversy over which law should be applied to bank mergers by making
the Clayton Act and the Bank Merger Act one and the same.
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banks attempting to merge.54 Each complaint alleged that the pro-
posed merger was a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act 55 be-
cause each merger would cause a lessening of competition within the
local areas affected by the merger, thereby contributing to the already
high concentration of banking operations in the State of Washington.56
In its application to the Comptroller of the Currency for approval
of its merger with First National Bank of Ferndale, Seattle-First Na-
tional Bank contended that because of state lak, merger was the only
way it could obtain a branch in the Ferndale area.57 Despite the ob-
stacles that Washington State law may present to branching, the De-
partment of Justice apparently is determined that some degree of
competition shall remain in Washington's banking industry. Therefore,
any mergers involving the larger banks in the state probably will be
opposed by the Justice Department.58
54. United States v. Washington Bancshares Inc., Old Nat'l Bank of Washington
and Oroville State Bank, Civil No. 3505 (E.D. Wash. filed May 25, 1971); United States
v. Marine Bank Inc., Nat'l Bank of Commerce and Washington Trust Bank, Civil No.
237-7102 (W.D. Wash., filed Oct. 22, 1971); United States v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank
and First Nat'l Bank of Ferndale, Civil No. 313-7102 (W.D. Wash., filed Nov. 24,
1971). In 1971 two mergers were allowed to be consummated in the state of Washington.
Puget Sound National Bank merged with National Bank of Mason County and Peoples
National Bank merged with the Bank of Vancouver. Puget Sound National Bank is not
among the top five banks in the state and thus its merger with the National Bank of
Mason County was probably not considered of sufficient impact on concentration to
warrant action by the Justice Department. The Bank of Vancouver was closely related
with Peoples National Bank from its inception which is probably why there was no
objection to the merger.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). See note 37 supra.
56. At the present time in the state of Washington banking is highly concentrated.
Seattle-First National Bank alone holds over 31% of all commercial bank deposits in
the state. The two largest banks, Seattle-First National and National Bank of Com-
merce, hold about 53% of the commercial deposits, and the five major banks in the state
in combination hold over 75% of all commercial bank deposits. Of the 658 commercial
banking offices in the state, 140 are banking offices of Seattle-First National Bank, 101
are offices of National Bank of Commerce, 61 are offices of Pacific National Bank, 52
are offices of Peoples National Bank, and 44 are offices of Old National Bank of Wash-
ington. This means that as of May 1971, 398 of the 658 commercial banking offices
were run by the top five banks in the state. In other words, approximately 60% of all
commercial banking offices are controlled by the top five national banks in the state,
which means that the remaining 89 state and national banks in the state only account for
40% of the banking offices in the state. See WASHINGTON SUPERVISOR OF BANKING, SIXTY-
FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1971 29-40 (1972); COMPTROLLER OF THE CUR-
RENcY, ANNUAL REPORT 1970, at 6 (1971); Application of Seattle-First National Bank to
Purchase Assets of First National Bank of Ferndale, to Comptroller of the Currency, May
1971, at 118. If mergers such as the one between National Bank of Commerce, the
second largest bank in the state, and Washington Trust Bank, the sixth largest, are ap-
proved, banking in the state would become even more concentrated.
57. Application of Seattle-First National Bank to Purchase Assets of First National
Bank of Ferndale, to Comptroller of the Currency, May 1971, at 27.
58. See note 46 supra.
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Opposition to bank mergers by the Justice Department, reinforced
by the Supreme Court in the Philadelphia National Bank, Third Na-
tional Bank, and Phillipsburg cases, is based on the effects of high
concentration on pricing in the banking industry. Studies have shown
that high market concentration in the banking industry often is asso-
ciated with higher interest rates charged on loans, lower interest paid
on time deposits, higher service charges on demand deposits, and
lower ratios of loans to assets and time deposits to total deposits.5 9
One study showed that a ten percent increase in concentration "results
on the average, in a decrease of approximately six basis points in the
average interest rate which banks pay on time and savings deposits,
and an increase of ten basis points in the average interest rate they
charge on loans. '60 Thus one might conclude that high concentration
of banking tends to hurt the consumer, justifying the Court's strong
position on preventing mergers in a highly concentrated market.
High concentration not only results in higher loan rates and lower
savings interest rates, but also tends to have a dampening effect on
possible development of competitive pricing. 61 Merger, the instrument
most often used to achieve high concentration, prevents price compe-
tition by eliminating competitors. Thus, mergers are highly attractive
to a banking industry understandably eager to avoid price competi-
tion.6 2 Banks know that because of the small number of competitors,
if one bank in the community drops its prices, the others usually will
have to follow. Rarely have banks participated in price wars, and if
price wars did take place, they would be extremely costly to the banks
involved.6 3
One argument advanced in defense of merger and concentration is
that mergers result in banks better able to provide larger loan limits
and more specialized products, such as trust services and credit cards. 64
The Court in United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank65 recog-
59. Edwards, The Banking Competition Controversy, THE NATIONAL BANKING RE-
VIEW, 12, 19 (1965).
60. Id. at 20. This study was based on bank performances in 36 major metropolitan
areas, of which Seattle, Washington was one.
61. 135 AMERICAN BANKER 4 (June 4, 1970).
62. Horvitz & Shull, Branch Banking, Independent Banks and Geographic Price
Discrimination, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 827, 832 (1969).
63. Id.
64. See United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l. Bank, 399 U.S. 350, 372 (1970).
65. Id.
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nized that such advantages often do result from a merger, but indi-
cated the "convenience and needs" exception of the 1966 Bank
Merger Act will be very narrowly construed. 66 The Court stated that
the merger would not be approved if there are alternative methods for
serving the needs of the relevant market; there must also be general
benefit rather than benefit only for "those interested in large loan and
trust services. '67
IV. PRESENT ALTERNATIVES FOR SATISFYING
BANKING NEEDS
Since de novo branching is foreclosed to Washington banks and
merger in many instances will be opposed by the Justice Department
because of potential anticompetitive effects, Washington banks and
communities in need of additional banking facilities must look to
other alternatives for geographic expansion.
One alternative is for an existing bank to acquire a branch of an-
other bank which is located in the desired banking market. While the
Department of Justice would oppose acquisition of a large or leading
bank in such a market, it probably would not object to one major
bank acquiring a branch of another. 68 Although such an acquisition
appears to be a permissible alternative under R.C.W. § 30.40.020, it
does have serious drawbacks. In two of the three cases filed in Wash-
ington during 1971 by the Justice Department, the bank to be ac-
66. Id. at 372.
67. The fact that lending limits have been increased is actually not very beneficial
even to the larger customers. According to David A. Alhadeff, Professor of Business
Administration at the University of California, larger customers of banks tend to be
more mobile than the average customer. This mobility gives them the opportunity to
seek loans throughout the state or nation. Thus:
[I] f the only effect of the enhanced lending limits were to enhance the merging
bank's ability to compete for the business of the most mobile... borrowers, the
private gain would be greater than the social gain. The reason of course, is that the
borrowers who are the intended beneficiaries of the merger already enjoy access to
bank credit on reasonably competitive terms and one more supplier would not
benefit them significantly any more than one less supplier would significantly un-
dermine their position.
INSTITUTE OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA BANKING AND COM-
PETITON 182 (1956).
68. This assumption is predicated on the fact that the branch being acquired does
not have assets of such a quantity that the concentration level in the state would be sig-
nificantly affected, nor would it leave the acquiring bank in a monopolistic position
within the local market involved. As of July 1972, the Justice Department has not op-
posed the acquisition of the branch of another bank.
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quired had no branches. 69 In addition, any bank large enough to have
branches probably will not be interested in selling one of its branches
if the sale causes increased competition in the geographic market of
the selling branch's other facilities. Thus, unless a bank can find an-
other bank which has a branch that continues to lose money, this al-
ternative may not be feasible.70 Further, a bank will hesitate to sell its
branch knowing that present state and federal law may prevent it
from reentering the market in which the branch is located at some
later date. Finally, although this alternative may be helpful to a bank
seeking to expand its operation, it is of absolutely no assistance to a
community in need of additional banking alternatives.
Utilizing a second technique already successfully implemented by
Peoples National Bank in the Vancouver, Washington area, a bank
assists in the formation of a new national bank and then after a suffi-
cient period of time merges with the new bank. Washington law re-
quires ten years to elapse after the formation of a new bank before
merger can take place, although exceptions are granted.71 In 1965 the
Bank of Vancouver was chartered as a national bank under the spon-
sorship of Peoples National Bank. In 1971, after the Bank of Van-
couver had been in existence for six years with the continuous assis-
tance of Peoples National Bank, the two banks merged and the Bank
of Vancouver became a branch of Peoples National Bank.72 Although
this alternative was successful for Peoples National Bank, it has some
definite limitations. R.C.W. § 30.04.230 restricts ownership of a bank
by a corporation to 25 percent of the bank's capital stock. 73 Thus, any
69. In United States v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank and First Nat'l Bank of Ferndale,
supra note 54, the First National Bank of Ferndale had no branches, and in United
States v. Washington and Oroville State Bank, supra note 54, the Oroville State Bank
had no branches.
70. It is also unlikely that an acquiring bank will buy a branch that is failing unless
the acquiring bank can determine that failure is due to poor management rather than an
insufficient number of accounts.
71. WASH. REV. CODE § 30.08.020(7) (Supp. 1972). An exception was granted in al-
lowing Old National Bank of Spokane, Washington to merge with North West Bank of
Seattle in 1970. Old National was Washington's fifth largest bank and North West Bank
had only been in business for seven years. While business was not good in the beginning,
North West Bank seemed to be holding its own at the time of the merger. See Decision of
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Application of Old National Bank
of Washington, Aug. 12, 1970.
72. Decision of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Application of
Peoples National Bank of Washington, March 5, 1971.
73. WASH. REV. CODE § 30.04.230 provides in part:
A corporation or association organized under the laws of this state, or licensed
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bank wishing to create a new national bank with the intent of later
merging with that bank must arrange to have other cooperative partic-
ipants involved in the formation of the new bank. Since the estab-
lished bank would not have control of the new bank, it would have to
rely on the good faith of the other participants when it came time to
recommend merger. In addition, the established bank may face oppo-
sition from the state when it requests approval of the merger from the
Comptroller. The state or a competitor may seek to enjoin the merger
on the ground that the established bank is attempting to circumvent
the state's bank branching laws by the use of this technique; the Jus-
tice Department may also challenge the merger under section 7 of the
Clayton Act. Finally, the amount of time that may elapse between the
time of creation and the time of merger may discourage use of this
device. Nevertheless, if the established bank can obtain the coopera-
tion of the other participants and survive possible legal action by the
state or a competitor,7 4 and if it complies with all the requirements of
the National Banking Act in the formation of the new bank,75 the es-
to transact business in the state, shall not hereafter acquire any shares of stock of
any bank, trust company or national banking association which, in the aggregate,
enable it to own, hold or control more than twenty-five percent of the capital stock
of such bank, trust company or national association ....
74. In Camden Trust Co. v. Gidney, 301 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1962), an action was
brought by Camden Trust to stop the Comptroller from approving the establishment of
a new national bank within Camden Trust's local market area. Camden argued that the
Comptroller could not approve creation of such a bank because it was formed to cir-
cumvent state law andthus was created for illegal purposes. Haddonfield National Bank
had attempted earlier'to establish a branch in the town in which Camden Trust was lo-
cated, but the Comptroller had disapproved the application on the basis that New Jersey
law would not permit the establishment of a branch in a town where there was already
an established bank. After this rejection, some of the directors of Haddonfield National
Bank together with some of the original stockholders of Haddonfield National applied to
the Comptroller to open a new bank in the town where Camden Trust was located.
Camden brought suit, arguing that the new bank was just a branch of the Haddonfield
National Bank and that the new bank was being formed for other than the legitimate
purposes covered by the National Banking Act. The court of appeals rejected this argu-
ment by pointing out that the old bank and the new were separate corporate entities
with separate corporate structures, had different names, maintained separate locations,
had independently determined loan limits and limits of indebtedness, and were not
liable for each other's deposit obligations. The court added that
It is not within our province to pass upon the desirability vel non of permitting a
national bank to have an affiliate, as the appellant has used the term. If such an af-
filiate is to be denied status, Congress must clearly say so. It is sufficient for our
disposition of the present controversy to observe that what was done was within the
authority conferred by the existing statutes.
Id. at 525.
75. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-78 (1970).
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tablished bank will have created a branch in a market area it desires
to enter.
A third alternative for a community in need of additional banking
facilities is to rely upon the chartering of new banks. However, state
and federal regulations establish high barriers to entry and limit the
possibility of newly chartered banks satisfying the banking needs of
the state.76 Federal banking authorities consider the following factors
before authorizing a new national bank charter or deposit insurance
for a state bank: 77
The financial history and condition of the bank, the adequacy of its
capital structure, its future earnings prospects, the general character of
its management, the convenience and needs of the community to be
served by the bank, and whether or not its corporate powers are con-
sistent with the purposes of this section.
These stringent standards apply to all new banks since virtually all
banks use deposit insurance. In 1969 and 1970, only one out of five
Washington applications for national bank charters was accepted by
the Comptroller of Currency.78
The deficiencies of these various alternatives prevent them from
becoming viable solutions to the general problem of maximizing bene-
fits from the state's commercial banking industry. A better solution to
the problem would be to allow statewide de novo branching.
V. WHY DE NOVO BRANCHING?
Establishment of de novo bank branching in Washington would
provide the benefits of modern commercial banking to the entire state
and generally increase competition at local levels. Since the justifica-
tions for present restrictions on'de novo branching have been shown
to be invalid in most instances, they should no longer be used as an
excuse to preserve the status quo in statewide commercial banking.
76. WASH. REV. CODE § 30.08.010 (Supp. 1972) establishes paid-in capital require-
ments for bank incorporations; WASH. REV. CODE § 30.08.030 (1961) requires the super-
visor to inquire into the character of the persons incorporating the bank and whether the
community will support the proposed bank.
77. Motter, Bank Formation and the Public Interest, reprinted in ADMINISTRATOR
OF NATIONAL BANKS, BANKING COMPETITION AND THE BANKING STRUCTURE 233, 234
(1966).
78. COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 1970, at 7 (1971), COMPTROLLER
OF CURRENCY ANNUAL REPORT 1969, at 7 (1970).
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The introduction of de novo branching on a statewide basis might
give the statewide consumer added financial services not presently
available to him. Services such as bank credit cards, specialized
checking accounts, and twenty-four hour check cashing facilities
could be made available to most residents of Washington and not just
those who live in the large urban areas of the state. Also, local banks
which presently have either monopoly power or are part of a tight olig-
opoly in the local banking market will make a much more concerted
effort to provide the intensive personal attention which large branch
banking operations find difficult to provide.79
Should de novo branching be allowed, one definite benefit that the
average banking customer would gain would be an increase in the
number of banking alternatives available to him. Presently, the av-
erage banking customer can do his banking only with those banks
which are headquartered in the city where he lives, which have
merged with a bank headquartered in his city, or which were for-
tunate enough to open operations in his city before any other bank
commenced operations. De novo branching would allow any bank
chartered within the State of Washington to do business in any city or
town within the state. Thus more banks would move into geographic
markets which at the present time offer customers few banking altern-
atives. For example, Spokane, which presently has a population of
approximately 170,000, offers its residents six commercial banking
alternatives. In California, where de novo branching is allowed on a
statewide basis,80 Fresno, which has approximately 166,000 people,
has nine banking alternatives available to its residents; Bakersfield,
which has less than half the population of Spokane, also has nine
79. Motter, Bank Formation and the Public Interest, reprinted in ADMINISTRATOR
OF NATIONAL BANKS, STUDIES IN BANKING COMPETITION AND THE BANKING STRUCTURE
233 (1966), demonstrates the competitive effects of entry of banks in markets previously
served by one bank by reproducing statements of the officers of new banks. For ex-
ample:
Case I. Loans used to be granted on the basis of whether the old bank wanted to
bother with them or not. Practically no consumer loans or farm machinery loans
were made. It appears that the other bank is now enthusiastically striving to serve
the borrowing needs of worthwhile customers. It is making small loans and we be-
lieve they are making some machinery loans.... [T] here has been a change in the
spirit in which those services are made available. Prior to the granting of our
charter, the existing bank made little effort to support community activities. We
find they now enthusiastically participate and the business climate of the com-
munity is improving because of it.
Id. at 280.
80. CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 500-506 (West 1970).
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banking alternatives available to its residents. Since Fresno and Ba-
kersfield are quite similar to Spokane in economic base and geographic
isolation from other large urban areas, some Washington banks not
presently doing business in Spokane probably would find it just as de-
sirable to open branches there as California banks not headquartered
in Fresno or Bakersfield found those two cities when they decided to
open branches there.81 With an increase in the number of competing
banks, the average banking customer would have more sources to
draw upon for his financial needs and might find a decrease in his
banking costs.
In addition, the justifications for restrictions on bank branching no
longer seem valid. Restrictions based on the rationale of preventing
"overbanking" and bank failures cannot be supported in view of the
rigid state and federal regulation of commercial banking.82 Deposit
insurance plus the fact that new bank branches must meet standards
similar to those set for the issuance of a new charter-including a
finding that the community needs additional facilities-provide more
than adequate protection against bank failure as the result of over-
banking.
Preserving local banks still seems to be a worthy objective which
need not be totally sacrificed by allowing de novo branching. If state-
wide de novo branching is allowed, certain weaknesses of the small
bank will be exposed to the vagaries of competition. Small banks are
normally less efficient than larger institutions, 83 often charging higher
loan rates and service charges, paying lower rates on time deposits,
offering fewer services, or, alternatively, matching the prices and ser-
vices of larger banks but paying the price with low profits. 84 However,
the small bank's inefficiency often is more than offset by a large
bank's high costs of maintaining a branch system and providing nu-
merous expensive services not normally employed at the local level.8 5
Moreover, because of their knowledge of the community, local banks
often are more willing to make unsecured "character loans" to indi-
81. At the present time there is evidence that at least one major bank, National
Bank of Commerce, wishes to branch into Spokane, but is foreclosed from doing so by
WASH. REV. CODE § 30.40.020 (Supp. 1972) and the Justice Department.
82. See notes 15-18 and accompanying text supra.
83. E. KOHN, THE FUTURE OF SMALL BANKS 5 (1966).
84. Id. at 5-6.
85. Id. at 6.
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viduals and small businesses,8 6 and there is evidence that much of the
public will not switch from small to large banks because of low prices
and service differentials. 87
A second factor is that small banks do not have the resources,
manpower or experience to match the advertising and solicitation
programs of larger banks. Further, the downtown location advantage
of the small local bank is being eroded by the- advent of convenient
shopping centers.88 However, the local banks long established per-
sonal and business contacts within the community, its knowledge of
the community, and the preferences of many people for doing busi-
ness with a locally "owned and managed institution" should "enable
the small bank to hold its own in the competitive struggle. '8 9
In viewing the arguments for restricting bank branching to protect
small banks, it is important to ask whether it is in the public interest to
protect small banks if they cannot or do not provide the banking ser-
vices that the public needs and wants at competitive prices.90 The state
banking structure is not regulated to protect existing banks against
competition. Rather, the regulations are designed to preserve public
confidence in a viable banking industry. Beyond this, state policy
should seek to maximize the benefits of commercial banking
throughout the state.
Recent studies show that small banks exposed to branch competi-
tion generally have been able to compete with large bank branches.9 1
In view of'this fact, Washington communities deserve the benefits of
modem commercial banking services and a variety of banking altern-
atives. Since small banks have sufficient advantages to enable them
to compete, they should be forced to do so.
If de novo bank branching is allowed, however, there invariably
will be some local banks that will not be able to compete. This un-
86. Id. at 7.
87. Id. at 6. This factor was alluded to by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357 n.34 (1963), where the Court quoted from a
witness' testimony that customers will keep their savings in commercial banks despite
the fact that a savings and loan across the street pays significantly more on savings ac-
counts.
88. E. KOHN, THE FUTURE OF SMALL BANKS 6 (1966).
89. Id. at 7.
90. id. at 3.
91. See Motter & Carson, Bank Entry and the Public Interest: A Case Study, re-
printed in ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS, STUDIES IN BANKING COMPETITION AND
THE BANKING STRUCTURE 187 (1966); KOHN, supra note 83.
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doubtedly will lead to an increase in the already high level of concen-
tration of banking in Washington. 92 However, it is important to keep
the disadvantages of concentration in perspective. In the first place,
banking competition occurs largely at the local level. 93 Thus, while de
novo branching may increase statewide concentration, competition
between large bank branches and local banks actually may be in-
creased at the local level. Secondly, banking is a highly regulated in-
dustry in which avenues for direct competition are limited.94 Although
there is some price competition, most direct competition between
banks involves quality of services. This allows local banks to compete
successfully because one of the inherent advantages of the local bank
is its edge in providing personalized quality services. 95
VI. A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL FOR DE NOVO
BANK BRANCHING
Legislation providing for de novo branching should be designed to
maximize the convenience and fulfill the needs of the average bank
customer while preserving a high degree of competition among banks
within the state. Drafting such legislation is difficult since in many
cases the decision to allow branching will be determined by the sin-
gular characteristics of the local market. However, included in the leg-
islation should be guidelines which limit subjective decision making
and insure the objectivity of the approving authority. The legislature
also should remember that state bank branching restrictions will be
binding on national banks. 96 Thus any legislation which controls con-
centration and regulates the anticompetitive effects of de novo
branching will apply to all banks within the state. The following is a
suggestion as to the form and content of such legislation.
92. See note 56 supra. In California, where state law provides for de novo branch-
ing, the largest bank in the state has 43.9% of the total deposits, and the top five banks
have over 80% of the state's deposits. CALIFORNIA STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT, TOTAL
DEPOSITS, TOTAL ASSETS, TOTAL CAPITAL AND NUMBER OF BRANCHES, CALIFORNIA IN-
SURED COMMERCIAL BANKS, RANKED IN ORDER OF DEPOSITS, as of June 30, 1971 (1971).
93. Discussions on the relevant geographic market in Philadelphia Natl Bank and
Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank specifically limited the market to the immediate metropolitan
area.
94. See notes 13-17 and accompanying text supra.
95. See notes 86 and 87 and accompanying text supra.
96. See notes 29-33 and accompanying text supra.
632
Vol. 48: 611, 1973
Bank Branching in Washington
1. BANK BRANCHING COMMISSION, CREATION:
A three man board shall be created and known as the Bank
Branching Commission. Its membership shall be made up of the
Supervisor of Banking, an assistant Washington State Attorney
General, and a member from the private sector who shall be
appointed by the Governor. The Commission shall have the
power to approve branch offices upon application from a bank
engaged in the business of banking within the state.
II. EXAMINATION OF APPLICATION:
The Bank Branching Commission may give or withhold its ap-
proval of an application in its discretion, but no application
shall be approved by the approving authority until it has been
ascertained that:
(a) The convenience and needs of the community to be
served will be promoted by the establishment of the pro-
posed branch office and
(1) That allowing a branch office will both (a) result in a
high degree of competition among commercial banks
in the local market and (b) will not unduly increase
commercial banking concentration throughout the
state.
(2) The approving authority shall also consider the needs
of all bank customers and not limit itself merely to
the advantages to be gained by the larger customers.
(b) The application shall not be approved unless the paid in
capital of the branch meets the paid in capital require-
ments of this chapter.
(c) The application shall not be approved unless the ap-
proving authority is able to ascertain that there is ade-
quate support for the bank branch office within the com-
munity in which expansion is contemplated.
III. DE NOVO BRANCHING, APPROVAL:
Upon approval by the approving authority the Supervisor of
Banking shall authorize the creation of the branch applied for in
the community requested. Operation of this branch shall be sub-




IV. TIME FOR OPENING OF BRANCH, EFFECT OF
FAILURE TO OPEN, EXTENSION OF TIME:
The branch must be open and in operation within one year after
authorization by the approving authority. Failure to open within
one year's time automatically terminates the application's au-
thorization. Extensions on the one year period will be granted
upon a showing of inability to begin operation due to circum-
stances beyond the control of the applying bank.
Richard B. Cohen*
* Trial Attorney, Antitrust Division, Justice Department; B.A., University
of'Washington, 1968;J.D., 1971.
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